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Abstract
This paper delineates the simultaneous impact of non-anticipated information on
mean and variance of the intraday return process by including appropriate variables
accounting for the news ﬂow into both the mean and the variance function. This al-
lows us to diﬀerentiate between the consistent price reaction to surprising news and
the traders’ uncertainty about the precise price impact of this information. Focussing
on the US employment report, we ﬁnd that headline information is almost instan-
taneously incorporated into T-bond futures prices. Nevertheless, large surprises, and
’bad’ news in particular, create considerable uncertainty. In contrast, if surprises in
related headlines cross-validate each other, less room for diﬀerences of opinion is left,
and hence volatility is decreased.
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This paper investigates the processing of macroeconomic news in ﬁnancial markets, in
particular surprises in headline ﬁgures of the US employment report. We model simulta-
neously two eﬀects of public news arrival: On the one hand, non-anticipated information
in public news induces a shift in traders’ beliefs about the equilibrium price level which
should result in a sharp and immediate price reaction. While average beliefs shift instan-
taneously, on the other hand, traders do not have to agree about the precise price impact
of a given piece of information. Uncertainty about the new equilibrium price level causes
prices to ﬂuctuate more widely around the new equilibrium level until a new consensus
is reached. We disentangle these eﬀects by controlling for the impact of non-anticipated
information on both the mean and the variance function of the return process.
As it is well known from previous literature on this topic, information arrival has an impact
on both prices and volatility in ﬁnancial markets (see e.g., Goodhart and O’Hara 1997
for an overview).1 Nevertheless, previous empirical studies on announcement eﬀects have
either focused on the impact of scheduled announcements on signed returns (e.g. Berkman
1978, Urich and Wachtel 1984, Hardouvelis 1988, Fleming and Remolona 1997, and Hess
2001) or on the volatility of returns (e.g. Harvey and Huang 1991, Ederington and Lee
1993, Fleming and Remolona 1999a, and Franke and Hess 2000a) neglecting relations
between the impact of non-anticipated information on the ﬁrst and second moments of
the return process.2 We close this apparent gap in the literature by modelling the impact of
announcements on both the mean and the variance function simultaneously. Our approach
provides some interesting insights into the processing of information. It enables us to
1There is also some tradition using volatility as a proxy for information arrival. See, e.g. Lamoureux
and Lastrapes (1990) or Franke and Hess (2000b).
2Note that a few studies investigate both signed returns and absolute returns, as well as some other
variables such as trading volume or bid-ask spreads. For example, Fleming and Remolona (1997) run
separate regressions of signed returns on surprises as well as of absolute returns and trading volume on
announcement dummies and absolute surprises. See also Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (1997). Nevertheless,
these studies do not model the simultaneous impact of announcements on ﬁrst and second moments.
1distinguish between a volatility shock arising from a news induced shift of the price to a
new equilibrium and a situation in which prices are just bouncing around, for example
because traders’ opinions diverge widely.
We use high-frequency data of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) T-bond future in order
to investigate the eﬀects of news arrival. One problem in this context is the simultaneous
occurrence of releases. To avoid an interference of eﬀects caused by multiple releases, we
analyze situations in which only one report is announced at a time. In particular, we focus
on the employment report, which is typically released at 8:30 a.m. ET (Eastern Time).
Besides being the most inﬂuential report,3 it has the nice property that the overlap with
other announcements is minimal. During the ﬁve-year sample used here, i.e. January 1995
to December 1999, only 7 out of the 60 employment announcement days are lost due to
an announcement of other releases at the same time. In order to keep the results free from
the inﬂuence of announcements made later on during the same day (in particular at 10:00
a.m.), we focus on a 90-minute window in which information processing should be dom-
inated by the release of the employment report.4 In contrast to Andersen and Bollerslev
(1998) who model the 24-hour volatility pattern in the foreign exchange market and try
to identify the main components of ’overall’ volatility, we focus on 90-minute subsamples
around announcements in order to analyze the processing of important macroeconomic
information and in particular its simultaneous impact on the mean and the variance of
T-bond futures returns.
The eﬀects of information arrival are analyzed by means of an intraday ARCH model with
multiplicative heteroskedasticity on 2-minute returns. Explanatory variables which capture
the time pattern and the impact of surprises are included in the mean function as well as
3Several studies document that the employment report has by far the highest impact on the mean
function (e.g. Balduzzi, Elton, and Green 1997, Hess 2001) as well as on the variance function (Ederington
and Lee 1993, Fleming and Remolona 1997).
4To provide a simple robustness check for our results, we also analyze information processing around
some other important reports, i.e. the announcement of the NAPM index, consumer prices, and housing
starts.
2in the variance speciﬁcation. In order to analyze the explanatory power of the diﬀerent
model components, their predictive performance is evaluated separately. This allows us to
diﬀerentiate between the explanatory power of the implemented ARCH component, the
variables capturing deterministic time patterns, and the additional explanatory variables,
i.e. surprises in headline ﬁgures.
Based on this estimation approach, we provide the following main ﬁndings: Non-
anticipated information leads to a sharp and consistent price reaction suggesting that
traders’ average beliefs shift almost instantaneously. Nevertheless, after controlling for the
eﬀect on the mean we still ﬁnd a strong and persistent increase in volatility which points to
considerable disagreement among traders about the precise implications of macroeconomic
news. These diﬀerences of opinion are only slowly resolved. Furthermore, we delineate the
diﬀerent modes of impact of non-anticipated information on volatility: We provide some
evidence that traders’ diﬀerences of opinion increase with the magnitude of a surprise (ab-
solute volatility impact). ’Bad’ news create considerably more uncertainty among traders
than ’good’ news (asymmetric impact). Surprises in related headline ﬁgures pointing in
the same direction reinforce the price signal, and thus leave less room for diﬀerences of
opinion (reinforcement eﬀect).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section reviews the
related literature. Section 3 characterizes the major information components of the em-
ployment report. Moreover, several hypotheses are derived concerning the processing of
outstanding information. Section 4 describes the data, explains the estimation procedure,
and presents the empirical results. In section 5 we analyze the information processing
around some other announcements in order to check the robustness of the results. Section
6 concludes.
32 Previous studies - a synthesis
The previous literature on announcement eﬀects can be divided into two branches, one
focussing on the impact of news on ﬁrst moments, the other focussing on second moments
of the price process. The ﬁrst branch analyzes the signed price impact of non-anticipated
information. The main question of this literature is which types of announcements sig-
niﬁcantly aﬀect the equilibrium price level. Usually, these studies measure the magnitude
of surprises employing survey data on analysts’ forecasts for certain headline ﬁgures con-
tained in macroeconomic reports. Non-anticipated information is then measured by the
deviation of a given headline ﬁgure (A¿) announced at time ¿ from the median of analysts’
forecasts (F¿). Hence, the surprise in the ith headline ﬁgure is given as Si;¿ = Ai;¿ ¡ Fi;¿.
Typically, the impact on the return in period t is investigated by regressing signed log
returns rt on surprises in some set of macroeconomic announcements (i=1,...,n), i.e.




where Di;t=¿ denotes headline speciﬁc dummy variables which take on the value 1 if
announcement i is made during the interval t, and 0 else. In addition, lagged returns or
variables controlling for seasonalities such as day-of-the-week eﬀects may be included in
such an analysis.5 Heteroskedasticity in the error term "t is usually not explicitly modelled.
Instead, heteroskedasticity consistent variance-covariance estimators are applied.
While early studies analyze daily returns,6 more recent studies regress returns in narrow
intraday windows around the announcements on surprises in headline ﬁgures in order to
separate the impact of scheduled announcements from other not explicitly observed news
which may arrive occasionally over the course of a trading day. Following this approach,
Becker, Finnerty, and Kopecky (1996), Fleming and Remolona (1997, 1999b), and Hess
5See, for example, Fleming and Remolona (1997) or Hess (2001).
6See, for example, Berkman (1978), and Urich and Wachtel (1981, 1984) who analyze money growth
announcements. Cook and Korn (1991) and Prag (1994) focus on employment reports. Hardouvelis (1988),
Dwyer and Hafer (1989), and Edison (1996), among others, investigate several releases.
4(2001), among others, ﬁnd that several US announcements have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on bond market prices. Evidence of announcement eﬀects in the foreign exchange spot
market is provided, for example, by Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998) and Dominguez
(1999).7 Overall, studies on ﬁrst moments suggest a signiﬁcant and immediate adjustment
of the level of prices to non-anticipated information. In particular, surprising information
in the employment report (especially in the nonfarm payrolls ﬁgure) triggers the most
pronounced price responses in both bond and foreign exchange markets.
A second string of the literature on announcement eﬀects analyzes volatility shocks due to
news arrival. First of all, these studies show that scheduled macroeconomic announcements
stand out from the steady ﬂow of information which hits ﬁnancial markets. Fleming and
Remolona (1997) ﬁnd that out of the 25 largest intraday price changes in the U.S. treasury
market all but one occurred after such an announcement, in particular after the release
of employment reports. This is conﬁrmed by Bollerslev, Cai, and Song (2000) for T-bond
futures, and Dominguez (1999) obtains similar results for the Deutsche Mark-US Dollar
spot rate.8
In contrast to studies focussing on the mean function, the literature on second moments
usually does not account for surprises in releases. In general, the impact of the mere
existence of an announcement is investigated, for example, by regressing absolute log
returns, jrtj, on the above deﬁned dummy variables which account only for the timing of
announcements, i.e.9




7See also Goodhart, Hall, Henry, and Pesaran (1993) who analyze the inﬂuence of two single news
events on high-frequency British Pound-US Dollar exchange rates.
8However, it is not clear whether these ﬁndings are due to consistent price reactions to new information
or just volatility shocks, since these approaches do not explicitly control for shifts of the mean function.
9See, for example, Ederington and Lee (1993) or Fleming and Remolona (1997). In general, seasonalities
in volatilities such as day-of-week or time-of-the-day eﬀects are controlled for by including appropriately
deﬁned additional dummy variables.
5Based on such speciﬁcations several studies document that quite a number of diﬀerent
types of releases have a signiﬁcant impact on (intraday) volatility, for example, Ederington
and Lee (1993), Franke and Hess (2000a) for T-bond futures, Fleming and Remolona (1997)
and Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (1997) for the interdealer T-bond market, and Harvey and
Huang (1991) and Ederington and Lee (1993, 1995) for foreign exchange spot and futures
markets.
The persistence of volatility after such an announcement is another issue which has gained
widespread attention. Analyzing daily returns, Jones, Lamont, and Lumsdaine (1998) as
well as Jones (1998) apply a switching GARCH model and ﬁnd no signiﬁcantly higher
interday volatility persistence after the release of the employment report and the pro-
ducer price index. In contrast, disentangling dynamic GARCH eﬀects and announcement
eﬀects on the basis of a ﬁltered GARCH model, Li and Engle (1998) are able to reject
the hypothesis that volatility persistence that stems from announcement days is the same
as from non-announcement days. Ederington and Lee (1993), for example, analyze the
sample variance in 5-minute intervals across announcement days and ﬁnd that volatility is
signiﬁcantly higher in the period associated with the announcement and that it declines
rapidly afterwards. This is conﬁrmed for several markets by various other studies (e.g. Ed-
erington and Lee 1995, Crain and Lee 1995, Balduzzi, Elton, and Green 1997, Fleming
and Remolona 1999a, and Franke and Hess 2000a).10
A detailed characterization of diﬀerent volatility components, including calendar features,
scheduled announcement eﬀects as well as persistent volatility (ARCH) components, in
the Deutsche Mark-US Dollar foreign exchange spot market is provided by Andersen and
Bollerslev (1998). They assume that the mean adjusted return process is given by
Rt;d ¡ E[Rt;d] =
p
ht;dut;d; t = 1:::;T; d = 1;:::;D; (1)
10Volatility seems to persist somewhat longer in more liquid instruments (see Christie-David and
Chaudhry 1999).
6where Rt;d = exp(rt;d) denotes gross returns and ut;d is an i.i.d. zero mean, unit variance
error term. Since Andersen and Bollerslev explicitly specify daily ARCH-eﬀects, the index





t;d collects the persistent volatility components which are modelled based on
GARCH processes on a daily and intradaily level11 and s2
t;d represents intraday and inter-
day seasonality components including also announcement eﬀects.
Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) illustrate the identiﬁcation and estimation of the diﬀer-
ent volatility components and evaluate their explanatory power. By discussing the major
driving forces of the volatility process, they conclude that announcement eﬀects are of
minor importance when the overall volatility in the 24-hour foreign exchange market is
modelled. Nevertheless, they show that major announcements lead to the largest returns
and induce a strong response of the price process immediately after the release.12
Overall, studies focusing on volatility do not account for the consistent price reaction
to non-anticipated information arrival which is well documented by studies on the mean
process. Usually, second moments studies are concerned with volatility forecasting, mainly
from a pre-announcement perspective, or with the identiﬁcation of volatility components in
order to characterize the driving forces of the overall volatility process. However, an impor-
tant question is whether the observed volatility spike after macroeconomic announcements
is merely due to a news induced jump of the price to a new equilibrium level.
In contrast to Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) or Bollerslev, Cai, and Song (2000), our ma-
jor objective is not the characterization of the diﬀerent components of overall volatility.
11In particular, Andersen and Bollerslev model ¾
2
t;d based on a daily GARCH process which is assumed





12Based on this framework (see also Andersen and Bollerslev 1997), Bollerslev, Cai, and Song (2000)
investigate intraday seasonal patterns in volatility after controlling for interday GARCH eﬀects and ﬁnd
supporting evidence for the T-Bond futures market.
7Instead we focus on the processing of non-anticipated information in scheduled announce-
ments. Therefore, our approach diﬀers with respect to two aspects: First, we control for the
price impact of non-anticipated information by including appropriate news ﬂow variables
into the mean function. Second, we do not study the 24-hour trading process. Instead, we
cut out narrow time periods around announcements in which we can identify the dom-
inant news items. Using only those periods in which we can avoid an interference with
other news releases, we have information on the timing of the news arrival but also on
the amount and the sign of surprises. We assume the following process for 2-minute log
returns:
rt ¡ E[rt] =
p





where, following the notation of Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), s2
t and ¾2
t capture ARCH
and announcement eﬀects, respectively. The expectation E[rt] is speciﬁed by E[rt] = x0
t¯,
where ¯ is a coeﬃcient vector and xt denotes the corresponding vector of explanatory
variables (see section 4 for more details on the speciﬁc deﬁnition of the variables). In
contrast to Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), we do not include any daily GARCH eﬀects
in the variance equation since we do not focus on a 24-hour period but on narrow time
windows around announcements.13 Ignoring the daily GARCH component seems to be
reasonable because we analyze announcements on a monthly schedule.14 Moreover, the
announcement eﬀects are very large relative to the interdaily GARCH eﬀects. However,
there is a heteroskedasticity component which is ignored in this analysis, and thus it is
crucial to use robust inference techniques. ¾2





accounting for intradaily ARCH eﬀects. The volatility component s2
t is speciﬁed as s2
t =
13For this reason we drop the daily index d.
14For more details see section 4.
8exp(w0
t°), including absolute surprises as well as signed surprises in the individual headline
ﬁgures of the employment report (see section 4 for more details). Estimating equations
(3) and (4) simultaneously, our approach may be viewed as a synthesis of the previous
literature on the mean and the variance of the return process.
3 Information diﬀusion in eﬃcient markets
What is it that makes markets react so sharply to macroeconomic announcements? How
does the price adjustment process to non-anticipated information work? In order to analyze
these and other questions, ﬁrst the information content of the major headline ﬁgures of
an employment report is described. Hypotheses concerning the impact of this information
on the mean and variance of returns are presented thereafter.
3.1 The information content of the employment report
Several studies have documented that the monthly report on the U.S. employment situ-
ation prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) is the most inﬂuential macroe-
conomic release for ﬁnancial markets.15 Its importance stems from the fact that it is an
extremely timely and comprehensive measure of economic activity. Nonfarm payroll em-
ployment, for example, is commonly seen as a coincident indicator of the business cycles.16
Moreover, both payroll employment and the unemployment rate provide a measure for the
tightness of the labor market and thus an indication of price pressures in probably the
most important input factor, i.e labor.
The employment report is a rather voluminous document containing a large amount of
detail information. This is one of the reasons why previous studies have focused on headline
ﬁgures which summarize this information. Another reason is the availability of so-called
15See, for example, Bollerslev, Cai, and Song (2000) or Fleming and Remolona (1999a) for its impact on
intraday volatility and Fleming and Remolona (1997) or Hess (2001) for its intraday price impact.
16See, for example Rogers (1998, ch. 1).
9consensus forecasts of these ﬁgures which allow to measure the non-anticipated part of
information arrival.17 Previous studies of the employment report restrict their attention
to two headline ﬁgures, the nonfarm payroll measure and the unemployment rate.18 In
addition to these, we use a third headline ﬁgure, i.e. average hourly earnings.19
Payroll employment and the (un)employment rate are strongly related, since both convey
information about overall economic activity, consumers’ spending power, as well as price
pressures arising from the labor market. Therefore, it may be argued that using one of these
ﬁgures is enough to capture most of the information. However, it is important to note that
they are derived from diﬀerent sources. While the (un)employment rate is derived from the
household survey, the payroll measure (like hourly earnings) is based on the much larger
establishment survey.20 Hence, in the short run they can move into opposite directions.
Although it is often argued that market participants consider the nonfarm payroll ﬁgure
to be more important, since changes in nonfarm payrolls are less volatile than changes in
unemployment rates,21 inspecting both ﬁgures might allow market participants to better
assess the probability of measurement errors.
As mentioned above, ﬁnancial markets also try to infer from employment ﬁgures whether
inﬂationary pressures are building up which may arise from an increased bargaining power
17Analysts’ forecasts of macroeconomic ﬁgures are not always unbiased and eﬃcient (see e.g. Becker,
Finnerty, and Kopecky 1996). However, there seems to be no systematic ineﬃciencies across diﬀerent
sample periods (see e.g. Hess and Moersch 2001).
18For example, Hardouvelis (1988), Dwyer and Hafer (1989) and Prag (1994) analyze surprises in unem-
ployment rates, Fleming and Remolona (1997) use nonfarm payrolls, and Cook and Korn (1991), Edison
(1996), Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (1997), and Hess (2001) use both headlines.
19A fourth headline ﬁgure, the average workweek, receives attention from time to time. This measure is
not employed here since MMS does not provide survey data for this ﬁgure until October 1998. Hence, only
a few data points are available.
20Based on interviews conducted with approximately 50.000 households, the (un)employment rate mea-
sures civilian noninstitutional employees including agricultural workers as well as self-employed persons.
In contrast, the nonfarm payrolls ﬁgure draws from the payroll records of approximately 390.000 estab-
lishments and counts jobs added in nonagricultural industries. See, for example, Rogers (1998) ch. 1, or
Niemira and Zukowski (1998) ch. 10.
21In fact, during our sample period the standard deviation of relative month-over-month changes in
nonfarm payrolls turns out to be 0.119%, in unemployment rates 0.161%, and in hourly earnings 0.244%.
See also Hess and Moersch (2001).
10of employees in a tight labor market. Related but more direct information is obtained
from average hourly earnings. Obviously, this ﬁgure provides a straightforward reading of
price changes in the input factor labor. However, while hourly earnings primarily measure
current price pressures, trends in employment may allow market participants to foresee
wage increases down the road. Hence, hourly earnings add to the picture of price trends
sketched by payrolls and unemployment rates by providing a look back.
Due to the diﬀerences in the information content of headline ﬁgures described above,
one would expect that surprises in any of these three headline ﬁgures contribute to the
explanation of returns observed after an announcement. This is stated by hypothesis H1.
H1: Informativeness of headline ﬁgures
After an announcement, prices react signiﬁcantly to non-anticipated information in
headline ﬁgures. Since all three headline ﬁgures are informative, they contribute to
the explanation of returns.
3.2 Eﬃcient processing of non-anticipated information
According to the well-known eﬃcient market hypothesis one would expect that prices
adjust immediately to public news arrival if this information is regarded to be important.
However, only non-anticipated information can move prices, because in an eﬃcient market
prices already reﬂect widely anticipated events. The unique dissemination procedure of
statistical agencies in the US guarantees that macroeconomic reports are released precisely
according to the schedule.22 Reporters are allowed to analyze the data in advance but they
are not allowed to communicate until the oﬃcial release time. When the phone lines are
turned on exactly at 8:30 a.m., headline ﬁgures are transmitted almost immediately to
traders on the ﬂoor as well as to other market participants via news agencies. Thus,
22See, for example, Ederington and Lee (1993, 1995) or Fleming and Remolona (1997, 1999a) for a
detailed description of these procedures.
11the most obvious non-anticipated information, i.e. surprises in headline ﬁgures should be
incorporated into prices within a few minutes (hypothesis H2). The time span until this
information is fully incorporated into prices may serve as a measure of market eﬃciency
in terms of the speed of information diﬀusion.
H2: Immediate price impact of headline information
In an eﬃcient market prices adjust immediately to non-anticipated information in
the widely awaited headline ﬁgures. Thus no systematic impact is found after a few
minutes.
Hypotheses H1 and H2 refer to the impact of information arrival on the mean function
of the return process. The following section deals with the implications for the volatility
process.
3.3 The volatility impact of information arrival
The sharply increased volatility immediately after macroeconomic announcements as well
as its persistence is well documented (see e.g. Ederington and Lee 1993, Crain and Lee 1995,
Fleming and Remolona 1997, 1999a and Franke and Hess 2000a). In order to delineate
the impact of macroeconomic announcements on volatility, we diﬀerentiate between four
components: (1) the impact of the mere existence of new information, i.e. the baseline
volatility time pattern related to the announcement of the employment report, (2) the
magnitude of non-anticipated information in this report, i.e. absolute surprises in headline
ﬁgures, (3) the asymmetric impact of good and bad news on volatility, i.e. signed surprises,
and (4) the ’reinforcement’ eﬀect of surprises in related headline ﬁgures, i.e. whether
surprises in newly created jobs (payrolls) and the overall (un)employment rate convey the
same message.
12The ﬁrst component captures a volatility increase due to an acceleration of the speed of
information diﬀusion after an announcement. This component accounts for the well-known
eﬀect that information arrival is associated with higher trading volume as well as higher
volatility (for a comprehensive overview see e.g. Karpoﬀ 1987 or Goodhart and O’Hara
1997). Note that this component does not account for speciﬁc details concerning the type
of information, the magnitude, or the direction of surprises. Hence, it captures the deter-
ministic time pattern of volatility around announcements as a baseline. One argument for
a persistently higher volatility after announcements stems from the mixture of distribution
hypothesis (Clark 1973, Harris 1987), stating that both volume and volatility are driven
by the rate of information arrival. Clusters in news then lead to a positively autocorrelated
volatility. Considering that an employment report contains a load of detail information
besides the exposed headline ﬁgures and assuming that this information is only gradually
processed, the mixture of distribution hypothesis provides one explanation for volatility
clustering after such a report. A somewhat related argument is provided by the sequen-
tial information arrival model (Copeland 1976, 1987), which assumes that not all market
participants receive the information at the same time.23 Another argument is that even if
market participants have the same access to the information at the same time, diﬀerences
of opinion about its price impact can persist for quite some time (e.g. Varian 1985, Kandel
and Pearson 1995, or Harris and Raviv 1993). Market participants may interpret the data
diﬀerently, either if they have additional private information, diﬀerent prior beliefs, or if
they use diﬀerent models to evaluate the impact of news. Hypothesis H3 summarizes these
arguments:
H3: Baseline volatility after an announcement
Volatility increases after an employment release and declines only slowly due to (1)
23This view is supported for example by Dacorogna, M¨ uller, Nagler, Olsen, and Pictet (1993) and M¨ uller,
Dacorogna, Dav´ e, Olsen, Pictet, and von Weizs¨ acker (1997), who argue that diﬀerent market participants
have diﬀerent time horizons to process information and to act upon it. This leads to waves in trading
activity and thus to waves in price volatility.
13the huge amount of detail information contained in this report, (2) traders’ diﬀerent
response horizons, and/or (3) diﬀerences of opinion about the precise price impact
of new information.
The eﬀect of an awaited employment announcement on the volatility before this event is
less clear. On the one hand there is some evidence that trading volume declines before
such an announcement.24 Then, the well-documented positive volume-volatility relation
(see e.g. Karpoﬀ 1987) would suggest that volatility before an announcement is lower.
However, a possible counterargument arises from the liquidity of markets. If speculative
trading dries out, liquidity trades may have a higher price impact. This would increase
volatility before an announcement.25 Hypothesis H4 follows the ﬁrst line of reasoning
suggesting a ”calm before the storm” eﬀect.
H4: Baseline volatility before an announcement
Volatility is depressed before an announcement.
The second component in the variance speciﬁcation accounts for the magnitude of non-
anticipated information in a report, measured by the deviation of announced headline
ﬁgures from analysts’ ’consensus’ forecasts. It seems to be unclear why large surprises
should lead to higher volatility, especially if one controls for the direct impact of surprises
on the mean function. Since these surprises have a high visibility, i.e. market participants
get the information very fast via news vendors such as Bloomberg or Reuters, one would
expect an immediate and consistent price reaction rather than a prolonged stage of random
ﬂuctuations. One explanation for a persistently high volatility could be that a surprise in a
24Fleming and Remolona (1999a), for example, report that trading volume in U.S. Treasuries is slightly
but insigniﬁcantly lower before an announcement. Franke and Hess (2000a) ﬁnd that Bund future trading
volume is signiﬁcantly lower in the 5-minute interval preceding 8:30 announcements and insigniﬁcantly
lower before releases scheduled at 9:15 and 10:00 ET.
25See, for example, Franke and Hess (2000a).
14headline ﬁgure increases the probability that there are also surprises in other less exposed
ﬁgures and that it is not easy for market participants to ﬁnd out what else might be
aﬀected. Therefore, market participants may have more diﬃculties in assessing the precise
price impact of larger surprises. In addition, surprises leave more room for diﬀerences of
opinion if one considers the possibility of imprecise measurements. For example, it may
be unclear whether a surprise is due to a measurement error, i.e. market participants may
disagree about the precision of the signal. Extreme surprises may even call the reliability
of forecast models in question. This is stated by hypothesis H5.
H5: Volatility impact of the magnitude of surprises
Larger surprises give rise to more pronounced diﬀerences of opinion. Hence, volatility
increases with the magnitude of surprises.
The third volatility component allows us to investigate whether ’good’ and ’bad’ news
have a diﬀerent impact on volatility (hypothesis H6). An asymmetric volatility response
coupled with an asymmetric mean response may be interpreted as evidence in favor of the
time-varying risk premium hypothesis (see e.g. Pindyck 1984 and French, Schwert, and
Stambaugh 1987). If risk is priced and traders anticipate that negative news will produce
a stronger increase in volatility, a higher required rate of return leads to a stronger decline
in prices. While this eﬀect has been studied in particular for stock markets, it should
be observed for bond prices too.26 On the basis of daily data, Li and Engle (1998), for
example, report strong asymmetric eﬀects of scheduled announcements on the T-bond
future. They ﬁnd that positive shocks depress volatility on consecutive days and vice
versa. While Li and Engle deﬁne ’good’ and ’bad’ news on the basis of the observed daily
return reactions, we directly exploit the sign of analysts’ forecast errors in the headline
26Although obviously not applicable to bonds, there is a second explanation for the asymmetric volatility
response in the stock market which draws on the leverage eﬀect (see e.g. Black 1976 and Christie 1982). A
drop in stock prices causes an increase of the market price of debt relative to the market price of equity.
This increase in the ﬁnancial leverage makes the stock riskier, and thus increases its volatility.
15ﬁgures to assess whether a surprise provides ’good’ or ’bad’ news.27 This allows us to
investigate asymmetric eﬀects for each of the headline ﬁgures separately.
H6: Asymmetric volatility impact of surprises
Traders’ uncertainty, and thus volatility, is higher for ’bad’ news than for ’good’
news.
The fourth volatility component is included in order to investigate a possible interaction
between surprises in headline ﬁgures in more detail. Recall that both the nonfarm payrolls
ﬁgure and the (un)employment rate may indicate future price pressures arising from a
tight labor market. Since these two ﬁgures are closely related, market participants can use
them to cross-validate each other. If both headline ﬁgures convey the same message, e.g. a
surprisingly high increase in nonfarm payrolls and a lower than expected unemployment
rate, the room for diﬀerences of opinion about a tight labor market is reduced. A large
surprise in one headline ﬁgure might be interpreted as a measurement error. If large
surprises in both ﬁgures occur which point in the same direction, then the possibility
of a measurement error is reduced. In this case, one would expect a sharp initial price
reaction, but on the other hand volatility afterwards should be comparatively low. In
other words, we should observe a more moderate increase in volatility if large surprises in
nonfarm payrolls and the unemployment rate cross-validate each other.28 Hence, the fourth
component examines whether multiple surprises pointing in the same direction reduce the
room for diﬀerences of opinion (hypothesis H7).
H7: Reinforcement eﬀect of surprises in related ﬁgures
27Li and Engle (1998) deﬁne, for example, ’big negative news’ as news corresponding with (daily) returns
lower than 33% quantile. In contrast, here, ’bad’ news is given by a higher than expected nonfarm payrolls
ﬁgure (S1
+), a lower than predicted unemployment rate (S2
¡), and a higher than forecasted average
hourly earnings announcement (S3
+).
28A ’large’ surprise will be deﬁned as a surprise exceeding one standard deviation.
16Volatility is lower if large surprises in the related nonfarm payrolls ﬁgure and the
unemployment rate mutually conﬁrm their messages, i.e. if both provide either ’good’
or ’bad’ news, since then less room is left for diﬀerences of opinion. Moreover, this




We analyze Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) T-bond futures returns in 2-minute intervals
during 90-minute windows around employment releases, more precisely from 8:22 to 9:52
a.m. ET (Eastern time). This window is suggested on the one hand by the ﬂoor trading
hours of the CBOT which start at 8:20 a.m.,29 and on the other hand by the release of
other macroeconomic announcements at 10:00 a.m. Log returns are calculated on the basis
of the last trading price observed in a given 2-minute interval. For example, the return
associated with the employment release, i.e. the 8:30-8:32 return, is computed from the last
price before the 8:30 announcement and the last price before 8:32. Since the employment
report is released almost always on Fridays, we do not have to account for day-of-the-week
eﬀects.30 We only use those days on which no other macroeconomic report is released
during the 90-minute period. Using a ﬁve-year sample, i.e. January 1995 to December
1999, we obtain 53 announcement days.31 CBOT T-Bond futures data are obtained from
the Futures Industry Institute. These are ’tick-by-tick’ data containing a time-stamped
29The deﬁnition of 2-minute returns does not allow to calculate a return for the 8:20-8:22 interval since
no price is observed before 8:20.
30Typically, the employment report is released on the ﬁrst Friday after the end of the month it refers to.
During the sample period 3 reports were announced on a Thursday since the ﬁrst Friday was a holiday.
Moreover, after controlling for the impact of announcements, Li and Engle (1998) do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between Thursdays and Fridays. This is in line with the ﬁndings of Ederington and Lee (1993),
Franke and Hess (2000a), and others suggesting that most of the day-of-week and time-of-the-day eﬀects
in bond markets can be explained by the announcement schedule.
317 days are removed at which either leading indicators, personal income, or gross domestic product were
released at the same time.
17record whenever a price change is observed. Transaction volumes are not recorded. Like
in previous studies, the front month contract is analyzed, i.e. the most actively traded
contract among the nearby and second nearby contract.32 As an illustration for the impact
of announcements, the 1% and 99% as well as the 5% and 95% fractiles of 2-minute log
returns are shown in ﬁgure 1.
[insert ﬁgure 1 around here]
To explore the eﬀect of the bid-ask bounce on the results, some experiments are conducted
using log returns computed on the basis of so-called ’pseudo equilibrium prices’ as sug-
gested by Ederington and Lee (1995). These are obtained as the average of the last two
prices in an interval. However, the results do not change in any meaningful aspect using
’pseudo equilibrium prices’. Neither coeﬃcients in the mean nor in the variance function
are aﬀected substantially. Although this is somewhat in contrast to the results reported by
Ederington and Lee (1995), it is not surprising since a higher aggregation level is used. The
inﬂuence of the bid-ask spread on returns in very narrow 10-second intervals is much more
pronounced since price changes are much smaller as compared to 2-minute intervals.33 In
addition, there seems to be a trade-oﬀ between the bias induced by the bid-ask spread
and the bias induced by averaging over lagged prices especially during periods of dense
information arrival.
Non-anticipated information is measured on the basis of survey data on analysts’ forecasts
provided by Standard & Poors Global Markets (MMS). Initially released non-revised ﬁg-
ures were extracted from the original monthly releases. Surprises are deﬁned as the diﬀer-
ence between initially announced ﬁgures and the median of analysts’ forecasts. To facilitate
32See, for example, Ederington and Lee (1995) or Franke and Hess (2000a).
33The impact of the bid-ask spread depends on the size of the bid-ask bounce relative to average (ab-
solute) price changes in a given interval. In an extremely liquid market, like the T-Bond futures market,
2-minute intervals seem to be enough to eliminate the inﬂuence of the bid-ask spread largely.
18a comparison between the headline ﬁgures, standardized surprises are used, i.e. for each
headline surprises are divided by the sample standard deviation of surprises.
4.2 Speciﬁcation of the mean function
In this subsection we focus on the mean function of the return process and estimate eq.
(3) without already specifying the (conditional) variance ht (eq. 4). Here it is assumed
to be time-invariant, i.e. ht = h.34 With rt denoting 2-minute log returns (£10;000) we
estimate
rt ¡ E[rt] =
p
h ¢ ut; where E[rt] = x0
t¯: (5)
The response of the price process to non-anticipated information is analyzed based on
the explanatory variables x which capture surprises in headline ﬁgures (see section 2).
Surprises in nonfarm payrolls, unemployment rates, and hourly earnings are denoted by
S1, S2, and S3, respectively. In addition, time dummies are deﬁned which take on the
value 1 for a given interval and zero else, i.e.
D¿ =
(
1 if t = ¿
0 else;
where t = 1;:::;45 denotes the 2-minute intervals between 8:22 a.m. and 9:52 a.m. More-
over, surprise dummies are deﬁned for each 2-minute time interval such that the surprise
variables interact multiplicatively with the dummy variables, i.e.
S¿ = D¿S; with S 2 fS1;S2;S3g
For example, the interaction term S28:32¡8:34 = D8:32¡8:34 £ S2 captures the impact of a
surprise in headline 2 on the return in the interval 8:32–8:34. In addition, lagged 2-minute
log returns are included in the regressions.
34This requires to use heteroskedasticity robust inference techniques.
19In a ﬁrst step, we analyze the impact of the diﬀerent types of information separately
by running simple OLS regressions of 2-minute log returns on diﬀerent sets of the corre-
sponding surprise variables. In all regressions the above deﬁned dummy variables cover
the interval from 8:28 a.m. to 8:36 a.m.35
[insert table 1 around here]
As a benchmark, the ﬁrst regression, i.e. speciﬁcation (1) in table 1, includes only a
constant and lagged returns. In addition, the second regression (spec. 2) includes variables
capturing detailed information concerning the ﬁrst headline ﬁgure, i.e. nonfarm payrolls
(S1). The following ﬁndings can be summarized:
First, the estimated coeﬃcients provide evidence for a signiﬁcant impact of the surprise
on the price, i.e. the higher the diﬀerence between the announced number and the cor-
responding forecast, the stronger the resulting decline of the price.36 The strikingly high
coeﬃcient of the 8:30-8:32 surprise dummy (S18:30¡8:32) supports hypothesis H1 which
says that the arrival of non-anticipated information causes sharp price reactions.
Second, the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients of the absolute nonfarm payrolls surprise dummies
(in particular jS18:32¡8:34j) suggest an asymmetric response to ’good’ and ’bad’ news. The
asymmetry in the response to surprises is particularly pronounced in the second interval37:
’Bad’ news still have quite a negative impact on returns in the 8:32-8:34 interval, while
’good’ news of the same size have almost no impact.38 Note, however, that a signiﬁcant
35We also included dummies capturing further intervals before and after the announcement but did not
ﬁnd any signiﬁcant impacts.
36Note that a higher than expected outcome of nonfarm payrolls as well as of hourly earnings is ’bad
news’ and should lead to an increase in interest rates and a decline in T-bond futures prices. In contrast,
a lower than expected unemployment rate is also considered to be ’bad news’ for T-bond futures.
37The asymmetric response in the 8:30-8:32 interval is only slightly signiﬁcant in speciﬁcation (2). It
becomes insigniﬁcant when the other headline ﬁgures are included (see spec. 5, table 1).
38For example, a surprise of plus one standard deviation (S18:32¡8:34 = jS18:32¡8:34j = +1) lowers
returns in the 8:32-8:34 interval by around 0:15%, i.e. (¡7:577 ¡ 7:093)=10000. In contrast, a surprise of
minus one standard deviation (S18:32¡8:34 = ¡1 and jS18:32¡8:34j = +1) increases returns only slightly,
i.e. (+7:577 ¡ 7:093)=10000.
20asymmetric response is found only for the nonfarm payrolls ﬁgure, but not for the other
headline ﬁgures.
Third, focusing on the time pattern of the price response induced by the payrolls surprise,
we ﬁnd signiﬁcant price movements between two minutes before (S18:28¡8:30) and four
minutes after the announcement (S18:30¡8:32 and S18:32¡8:34 as well as jS18:30¡8:32j and
jS18:32¡8:34j). The signiﬁcant price reaction in the 8:28 to 8:30 interval provides some
evidence for slight leakage eﬀects. This result is quite surprising, since in the US strict
lock-up conditions should rule out any leakage of information.39 However, the largest price
reaction is observed within the 8:30-8:32 interval. This reaction sharply declines between
8:32-8:34 and disappears within the following 2-minute interval. These results indicate
that the T-bond futures market rapidly advances towards a new equilibrium level after
the arrival of non-anticipated information. Thus, the ﬁnding of a fast information diﬀusion
strongly supports hypothesis H2.
The analysis described above is repeated for the remaining two headline ﬁgures, i.e. the
unemployment rate S2 and hourly earnings S3. Regression results are given in columns (3)
and (4) of table 1. Again, surprises in these headline ﬁgures cause strong price responses
within the 8:30-8:32 interval coinciding with the announcement.
Since after 8:32 no statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence is found, non-anticipated information
associated with the unemployment rate and hourly earnings seems to be processed even
more rapidly. The adjustment is basically completed within two minutes after the release.
Moreover, note that the signs of the estimated coeﬃcients for signed surprise dummies
(S28:30¡8:32, S38:30¡8:32) support the hypothesized price reactions. T-bond futures prices
rise in response to ’good’ news from the inﬂation front, i.e. a lower than expected increase
in nonfarm payrolls, a higher than expected unemployment rate, and a lower than expected
average hourly earnings ﬁgure. In contrast to the nonfarm payrolls, there is no indication
39However, note that if we model the mean and the variance simultaneously, the signiﬁcance of this eﬀect
is reduced. See the results provided in the following section.
21of an asymmetric response to surprises in these ﬁgures since the jS2¢j and jS3¢j coeﬃcients
are insigniﬁcant.40
In regressions (5) and (6), the joint impact of the diﬀerent types of non-anticipated in-
formation is evaluated. A very important result is that the estimated coeﬃcients remain
relatively stable when the corresponding explanatory variables, associated with surprises
in the other headline ﬁgures, are included. In general, the signiﬁcance of the variables is
nearly unchanged which illustrates the robustness of the results. These ﬁndings indicate
that each of the diﬀerent types of non-anticipated information contributes to the explana-
tion of the return process which provides strong evidence in favor of hypothesis H1. Thus,
market participants do not only assign weight to nonfarm payrolls but also pay attention
to unemployment rates and hourly earnings.
In order to achieve a more parsimonious representation of the mean function, in regression
(6) only those surprise variables are included which turned out to be signiﬁcant in the
previous regressions, i.e. (1) to (5). Note that no substantial change in the estimated
coeﬃcients is recorded, besides for the insigniﬁcant jS18:30¡8:32j variable.
The analysis of the explanatory power of the particular models based on the adjusted
coeﬃcient of explained variation ¯ R2 yields some interesting insights: First, accounting
for autocorrelation in returns without including surprise variables (column 1) explains
virtually nothing ( ¯ R2 = 0.1%). Second, including surprise variables associated only with
one of the headline ﬁgures results in a substantial increase of the explanatory power
(nonfarm payrolls +18:0%, unemployment rates +13:5%, and hourly earnings +5:7%).41
40In contrast to S1, for which signed and absolute surprises are virtually uncorrelated (corr(S1;jS1j) =
0:04), the correlation of S2 and jS2j is ¡0:37 and that of S3 and jS3j is 0:46. Hence, including both
signed and absolute variables causes multi-collinearity eﬀects. This becomes evident by the changes of the
coeﬃcient signs of the insigniﬁcant jS2j and jS3j variables (compare columns (3) and (5), and (4) and (5),
respectively).
41While the employment release is often referred to as ’the king of announcements’ (See, for example, Li
and Engle 1998, or Andersen and Bollerslev 1998), the results of these regressions suggest that the nonfarm
payroll component ’wields the scepter’. Nevertheless, the regularly neglected hourly earnings ﬁgure still
has some explanatory power.
22Third, including all three headline ﬁgures (model 5), explains 32.4% of the total variation
which is a quite satisfying result for an intraday return process. The strongly reduced
model, which includes only the signiﬁcant variables (column 6), explains 31.2% of the
variation.
4.3 Speciﬁcation of the variance function
Besides the analysis of the price impact, a further major issue in this paper is the inves-
tigation of the variance impact of the arrival of non-anticipated information. To analyze
the time pattern of the volatility response, we use an ARCH speciﬁcation with multiplica-
tive heteroskedasticity. While in the previous section the variance ht was assumed to be






where wt is a vector of explanatory variables consisting of the surprise variables and time
dummies entering the variance speciﬁcation collectively as multiplicative heteroskedastic-
ity. wt includes a constant term which can be interpreted as a baseline volatility level. °
is the corresponding coeﬃcient vector.
As discussed in section 2, we neglect any daily GARCH components since we focus on
90-minute windows around announcements of the employment report which is released on
a monthly schedule. Moreover, we are primarily interested in the variance response due to
surprise eﬀects and not in the volatility persistence. Therefore, only three ARCH terms
are included.42 This seems to be appropriate to capture the variance dynamics within the
particular 90-minute windows. However, since we neglect a possible volatility component,
we use a robust inference based on pseudo ML estimates of the variance-covariance matrix
(see Bollerslev and Wooldridge 1992).
42Note that the implementation of a GARCH eﬀect would lead to an inclusion of the explanatory
variables in the model dynamics which would complicate the interpretation of the results.
23The mean function is modelled based on the speciﬁcation of column (6) in table 1. The
estimation results for the complete model are given in table 2.
[insert table 2 around here]
As a starting point, a simple ARCH(3) speciﬁcation is given in column (1) of table 2.
It illustrates the existence of a signiﬁcant ﬁrst order serial dependence in the variance
function with an ARCH coeﬃcient of 0:521. Note that for all models the signiﬁcance of
the ARCH(2) coeﬃcients is substantially lower and the ARCH(3) term is insigniﬁcant.
Columns (2) to (6) show the results of ARCH models with multiplicative heteroskedastic-
ity. The model given in column (2) accounts for the deterministic pattern of volatility by
including a set of time dummies covering the period from 8:26 a.m. to 9:40 a.m. 43 The
variance peaks out in the interval just after the announcement (8:30-8:32) and declines
almost monotonically until about one hour after the event. After this period, we do not
ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences compared to the volatility level of the base category. Since the
explanatory variables enter the variance equation exponentially, at its peak between 8:30
and 8:32, the conditional variance is more than 50 times higher than the variance in the
base period, while it drops to a factor of around 9 in the following interval. 30 minutes
after the announcement, the conditional variance is just about twice as high as in the base
period. Thus, we ﬁnd an extreme volatility response immediately after the announcement,
followed by a relatively strong decline within the ﬁrst minutes and a more slowly decay-
ing structure a longer time after the news arrival. Hence, these ﬁndings strongly support
hypothesis H3.
Furthermore, some empirical evidence is obtained indicating that volatility starts to rise
between 8:26 to 8:28 and shows a strong increase just before the announcement. Therefore,
43The base category is the time before the announcement (8:22-8:26) and the last 12 minutes of the
analyzed time interval (9:40-9:52). This categorization is quite reasonable as it allows us to analyze the
variance response due to announcement eﬀects compared with the variance level before and a longer time
after the announcement.
24hypothesis H4 is clearly rejected. The detection of a pre-announcement surge in volatility
is in line with the results of Ederington and Lee (1995), Fleming and Remolona (1999a),
Franke and Hess (2000a), and others.
A further important ﬁnding is a signiﬁcant decrease of the ARCH coeﬃcients compared
to speciﬁcation (1) which indicates that the volatility response due to the arrival of non-
anticipated information seems to be a major source of autocorrelation in the volatility
process.
In regressions (3) and (4), both variables accounting for the deterministic time pattern
and the surprise variables are included. Note that these variables enter the variance spec-
iﬁcation multiplicatively, i.e. the surprise variables interact with the complete set of time
dummies, leading to proportional downward or upward shifts of the variance function.
In column (3), variables capturing the magnitude of surprises in the three headline ﬁg-
ures are added, i.e. absolute surprises (jS1j, jS2j, and jS3j). We ﬁnd signiﬁcantly positive
coeﬃcients, thus large surprises lead to higher variances which supports hypothesis H5.
Column (4) allows to investigate asymmetric eﬀects by adding signed surprises (S1, S2,
and S3). The results suggest a signiﬁcant positive impact of ’bad’ news for S1 and S3
which conﬁrms hypothesis H6.44 No signiﬁcant asymmetric inﬂuence is found for S2.
The model in column (5) includes both signed as well as absolute surprise variables. Note
that the coeﬃcients and corresponding standard errors remain quite stable, indicating
the robustness of the results. This conﬁrms the preliminary results of model (3) and
(4). Hence, we obtain empirical evidence for the existence of absolute eﬀects (H5) and
asymmetric eﬀects (H6) of surprises in nonfarm payrolls and hourly earnings.45
Finally, model (6) includes two interaction terms between surprises in nonfarm payrolls
44Recall that positive surprises in S1 and S3 cause negative price movements. In contrast, negative price
movements are caused by negative surprises in S2.
45Similar asymmetric eﬀects associated with scheduled announcements have also been found by Li and
Engle (1998) based on daily data. However, Li and Engle deﬁne ’negative’ news indirectly on the basis of
the observed price reaction rather than including the signed surprise.
25and unemployment rates in order to test for the reinforcement eﬀect stated by hypothesis
H7. IS1++S2¡¡
takes on the value one if a large46 positive value for S1 and at the same time
a large negative value for S2 is observed and zero else. This dummy variable is interacted
with the time dummies, creating a separate variable for the interval from 8:30 to 8:38 in
which volatility is extremely high, i.e. IS1++S2¡¡
8:30¡8:38 , and another variable for the subsequent
phase of rather moderately increased volatility, i.e. IS1++S2¡¡
8:38¡9:20 . As hypothesized by H7, a
strong and highly signiﬁcant reduction of volatility is found if both headline ﬁgures convey
extremely bad news and thus mutually reconﬁrm their messages.47 This indicates that the
room for diﬀerences of opinion is signiﬁcantly reduced if reconﬁrmation of bad news reduces
the possibility of a measurement errors. Then volatility is substantially decreased.
Analyzing the goodness-of-ﬁt of the particular speciﬁcations based on the Bayes Infor-
mation Criterion (BIC) reveals that the inclusion of time dummies leads to the strongest
improvement. This result illustrates the importance of accounting for the time pattern of
the volatility response due to announcement eﬀects. Further improvements of the model
are reached by the inclusion of the particular surprise variables. The lowest BIC value is
obtained based on speciﬁcation (5).
In order to evaluate the goodness-of-ﬁt of the diﬀerent volatility speciﬁcations based on in-
sample predictions, we follow Pagan and Schwert (1990) and regress the 2-minute squared
residuals ˆ ²2
t on the corresponding variance forecasts ˆ ht based on the individual speciﬁca-
tions (1 to 6), i.e. ˆ ²2
t = a0 + a1ˆ ht + ºt. Then, the goodness-of-ﬁt is evaluated based on
the coeﬃcient of explained variation R2 associated with this regression as well as on the
estimates ˆ a0 and ˆ a1. 48 Results of this estimation are given in the last four lines of table
2. They show that the predictive performance increases substantially when explanatory
variables capturing the volatility response due to the announcement schedule are included.
46Here, large is deﬁned as exceeding one standard deviation.
47We also analyzed positive reinforcement eﬀects, i.e. extremely ’good’ news in the two headline ﬁgures,
but these did not turn out to be signiﬁcant.
48Note that unbiased predictions imply values of a0 = 0 and a1 = 1.
26This conﬁrms the ﬁndings based on the BIC. Again, the goodness-of-ﬁt is only slightly
improved when the particular surprise variables are taken into account. For the complete
model, i.e. speciﬁcation (6), the highest R2 is obtained (0.287) corresponding to a correla-
tion between squared residuals and variance predictions of Corr(ˆ ²2
t;ˆ ht) = 0:536. However,
the fact that the estimated slope coeﬃcient a1 is signiﬁcantly larger than 1 indicates that
speciﬁcation (6) yields slightly biased predictions. Moreover, we obtain a higher BIC value
than for speciﬁcation (5). Hence, highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates indicate the exis-
tence of reinforcement eﬀects, whereas the BIC criterion and the in-sample forecast tests
suggest that the overall model performance is not increased.
5 Stability of the results – A look at other announcements
To complete our analysis and to provide a simple robustness test, we analyze the process-
ing of non-anticipated information contained in three other, quite diﬀerent macroeconomic
releases: the report of the National Association of Purchasing Managers (NAPM), con-
sumer prices (CPI), and housing starts (HS).49 Analysts’ forecasts are available for one
headline ﬁgure of the NAPM report (i.e. the overall index) and the HS report (i.e. the
total number of residential construction starts) and for two headline ﬁgures of the CPI
report (i.e. the overall CPI and the core CPI which excludes volatile food and energy
prices). Although two CPI headlines are available, in contrast to the employment report’s
unemployment and payroll ﬁgures, the CPI ﬁgures do not originate from diﬀerent surveys.
Since the core CPI only removes some prices from the overall CPI’s basket, a considerable
overlap remains in what is measured by the two ﬁgures. Consequently, a high correlation
49The NAPM index provides even more timely information about economic activity than the employment
report since it is typically released a few days earlier. In contrast, the BLS’s CPI report is announced
around one week later, and another week later, the Commerce Department’s housing start ﬁgures. While
the NAPM index and housing starts allow market participants to gauge the strength of economic activity,
and hence possible inﬂation pressures, the CPI report provides a direct reading of price changes. For more
details see, for example, Rogers (1998).
27coeﬃcient between surprises in the total CPI and the core CPI is found, i.e. 0.61.50 This
leads to multi-collinearity problems, especially if we include both signed and absolute sur-
prise variables into our analysis. Besides the high correlation, the fact that the CPI ﬁgures
are not based on diﬀerent surveys, and hence, do not allow traders to gain much evidence
about the occurrence of measurement errors, precludes an analysis of the reinforcement
eﬀect. Therefore, we perform the analysis for each headline ﬁgure separately. Neverthe-
less, we are able to check the robustness of the remaining results reported in the previous
section.
Again, we measure surprises as deviations from MMS forecasts and apply a 90-minute
window around the release of each report.51 Analyzing unique announcements, we exclude
those days on which other reports are announced in this interval. While the overlap with
other announcements is minimal for the employment report, we loose considerably more
observations for the other three announcements, in particular for the NAPM and CPI
report (see table 3).
[insert table 3 around here]
Estimation results for the simultaneous mean and variance impact of the individual head-
line ﬁgures are given in table 3. First, focussing on the mean function the following results
can be summarized: Again, non-anticipated information is processed rather rapidly.52 With
the exception of the NAPM index, the highest impact is found in the announcement in-
terval (S18:30¡8:32). Nevertheless, the magnitude of this impact is considerably lower as
50This is due to the fact that announced changes in the total and core CPI ﬁgures are highly corre-
lated, i.e. 0.55. In contrast, announced changes in unemployment rates and nonfarm payrolls are almost
uncorrelated, i.e. -0.18.
51Surprises are standardized by their sample standard deviation. For the NAPM report which is released
at 10:00 ET we use the window from 9:52 to 11:22. Since the other reports are announced at 8:30 ET, we
apply the same window as for the employment report, i.e. 8:22–9:52.
52The signs of the estimated surprise variables are in accordance with standard theory: A higher than
expected NAPM or HS reading indicates higher economic activity which might lead to a higher expected
real interest rates and/or to higher expected inﬂation rates. CPI ﬁgures provide a direct measure of (past)
inﬂation rates. Hence, surprises in the four headline ﬁgures should have a negative impact on T-bond
futures returns.
28compared to the employment report. There seems to be some lagged response to the
NAPM release (but also a leakage eﬀect) which may be due to a less strict announcement
procedure of this non-government report. However, for the other reports the processing of
non-anticipated information is completed within the ﬁrst two minutes after the announce-
ments. Moreover, similar to the nonfarm payrolls ﬁgure, indications of an asymmetric
mean response are found for all the four headline ﬁgures. Overall, a similar reaction of the
conditional mean function of the return process to non-anticipated information in these
ﬁgures is observed, although the reaction to employment ﬁgures is much more pronounced.
Nevertheless, this ﬁnding strongly conﬁrms the above reported results with respect to the
mean impact.
In addition, the impact of the four ﬁgures on the variance process also resembles the vari-
ance impact of the employment headlines. Again, only small but mostly highly signiﬁcant
ARCH(1) coeﬃcients are found, while only one ARCH(2) and no ARCH(3) term is signif-
icant when surprise variables are included into the speciﬁcation. Moreover, the estimated
deterministic volatility pattern is quite similar. It shows a strong increase of volatility after
the announcement, followed by a rapid decline to the base level. However, the volatility
peak is not quite as high (e.g. for NAPM ’only’ 10 times higher than the base level) and
volatility returns faster to the base level (within about 30 minutes).53 More importantly,
the results concerning the impact of surprises on the volatility are strongly conﬁrmed. For
all the four ﬁgures we ﬁnd a (highly) signiﬁcant positive impact of absolute surprises. In
addition, the estimated coeﬃcients of the surprise variables are of comparable magnitudes,
only absolute NAPM surprises seem to have a somewhat stronger impact. The results for
the asymmetric volatility response are also conﬁrmed: For all the four headline ﬁgures we
ﬁnd again that ’bad’ news, i.e. positive surprises which have a negative impact on returns,
raise the volatility.
53This is in line with the ﬁndings of Bollerslev, Cai, and Song (2000) that the deterministic volatility
pattern around employment releases is higher and more persistent in comparison to other releases.
29Overall, these results suggest that the simultaneous mean and variance impact of non-
anticipated information in the employment report is not a unique phenomenon. Non-
anticipated information in widely awaited macroeconomic headline ﬁgures is incorporated
very rapidly into T-bond future prices suggesting that traders’ average beliefs about the
new equilibrium price level shift almost instantaneously. But surprises also create uncer-
tainty. Volatility is higher after large surprises, in particular after ’bad’ news, indicating
that traders’ opinions about the precise price impact are more dispersed. Although these
eﬀects on ﬁrst and second moments are quite similar across individual releases, the em-
ployment report is special in the sense that it allows market participants to cross-validate
information provided by its headline ﬁgures. This is due to the fact that nonfarm pay-
rolls and unemployment rates are derived from two independent surveys. Therefore, the
employment report allows market participants a better assessment of the probability of
measurement errors. In situations where measurement errors can be ruled out, less room
for diﬀerences of opinion is left, and hence volatility is reduced.
6 Conclusions
This paper scrutinizes the processing of information contained in the U.S. employment re-
port. The impact of non-anticipated information arrival on both ﬁrst and second moments
of the return process is analyzed. This allows some interesting insights into the creation
of uncertainty by the release of macroeconomic news.
In contrast to the previous literature which investigates volatility while refraining from
including variables into the mean function that account for surprises, we control for the
consistent price reaction to non-anticipated information. With a completely speciﬁed mean
function, the volatility function receives a diﬀerent interpretation: Rather than capturing
just the ﬂuctuations of squared returns, the volatility function describes market partic-
ipants’ uncertainty about the precise price impact of new information, while the mean
30function describes the shift in average beliefs about the new equilibrium price level in-
duced by the arrival of non-anticipated information.
The main results derived on the basis of this estimation approach are as follows. First,
surprises in all three headline ﬁgures have a distinct impact on the level of prices, with the
nonfarm payrolls ﬁgure having the strongest impact. Second, non-anticipated information
leads to an almost instantaneous price reaction which is completed within the ﬁrst two to
four minutes. This indicates that the market advances very rapidly to a new equilibrium
price level. Third, volatility is slightly higher before the announcement, which might be
due to a temporary illiquidity before the announcement. Volatility surges immediately
afterwards. In particular, volatility peaks out in the 2-minute interval associated with
the announcement, and is substantially reduced in the following interval, though remain-
ing elevated for about one hour. The high volatility after the announcement suggests that
there is considerable uncertainty about the precise price impact of new information. Forth,
strong magnitude eﬀects of surprises are found to have an impact on volatility, i.e. larger
surprises do not only lead to a more pronounced price reaction, they also create more
uncertainty. Fifth, there are strong asymmetric eﬀects, i.e. ’bad’ news measured in terms
of the surprises contained in headline ﬁgures raise the volatility substantially while ’good
news’ reduce traders’ uncertainty. This suggests that market participants have more diﬃ-
culties to assess the precise price impact of news when negative shocks occur. Last but not
least, a strong interaction is detected between headline ﬁgures with a related information
content. Pointing in the same direction, extremely bad news in the nonfarm payrolls ﬁgure
reinforce the signal of a devastating unemployment rate reading. This cross-validation of
extreme signals leaves less room for traders’ diﬀerences of opinion, and hence decreases
volatility.
Analyzing the stability of these results, similar eﬀects are found for other scheduled an-
nouncements. This suggests some regularities in the processing of non-anticipated macroe-
31conomic information. However, the fact that the main employment headlines are derived
from two independent surveys distinguishes the employment report to some extent from
other releases. This dual-survey sampling allows market participants a more accurate as-
sessment of the probability of measurement errors, and hence a more precise assessment
of the price impact of the survey results.
32References
Almeida, A., C. A. E. Goodhart, and R. Payne (1998): “The eﬀects of macroe-
conomic news on high frequency exchange rate behavior,” Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis, 33, 383–408.
Andersen, T. G., and T. Bollerslev (1997): “Intraday periodicity and volatility
persistence in ﬁnancial markets,” Journal of Empirical Finance, 4, 115–158.
(1998): “Deutsche Mark-Dollar volatility: intraday activity patterns, macroeco-
nomic announcements and longer run dependencies.,” Journal of Finance, 53, 219–265.
Balduzzi, P., E. J. Elton, and C. Green (1997): “Economic news and the yield
curve: Evidence for the U.S. Treasury market,” Discussion paper, New York University,
Oktober 1997.
Becker, K. G., J. E. Finnerty, and K. J. Kopecky (1996): “Macroeconomic news
and the eﬃciency of international bond futures markets,” Journal of Futures Markets,
16, 131–145.
Berkman, N. G. (1978): “On the signiﬁcance of weekly changes in M1,” New England
Economic Review, May-June, 5–22.
Black, F. (1976): “Studies in Stock Price Volatility,” in Proceedings of the 1976 Busi-
ness Meeting of the Business and Economic Statistics Section, American Statitistical
Association, pp. 177–181.
Bollerslev, T., J. Cai, and F. M. Song (2000): “Intraday periodicity, long memory
volatility, and macroeconomic announcement eﬀects in the US Treasury bond market,”
Journal of Empirical Finance, 7, 37–55.
Bollerslev, T., and J. M. Wooldridge (1992): “Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estima-
tion and Inference in Dynamic Models with Time-Varying Covariances,” Econometric
Review, 11, 143–172.
Christie, A. A. (1982): “The stochastic behavior of common stock variances – value,
leverage, and interest rate eﬀects,” Journal of Financial Economics, 10, 407–432.
Christie-David, R., and M. Chaudhry (1999): “Liquidity and maturity eﬀects around
news releases,” Journal of Financial Research, 22, 47–67.
Clark, P. K. (1973): “A subordinated stochastic process model with ﬁnite variance for
speculative prices,” Econometrica, 41, 135–155.
33Cook, T., and S. Korn (1991): “The reaction of interest rates to the employment report:
The role of policy anticipations,” Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond,
77, 3–12.
Copeland, T. E. (1976): “A model of asset trading under the assumption of sequential
information arrival,” Journal of Finance, 31, 1149–1168.
(1987): “The eﬀect of sequential information arrival on asset prices: An experi-
mental study,” Journal of Finance, 42, 763–797.
Crain, S. J., and J. H. Lee (1995): “Intraday volatility in interest rate and foreign
exchange spot and futures markets,” Journal of Futures Markets, 15, 395–421.
Dacorogna, M. M., U. A. M uller, R. J. Nagler, R. B. Olsen, and O. V. Pictet
(1993): “A geographical model for the daily and weekly seasonal volatility in the foreign
exchange market,” Journal of International Money and Finance, 12, 413–43.
Dominguez, K. M. (1999): “The Market Microstructure of Central Bank Intervention,”
Discussion Paper W7337, Cambridge, MA.
Dwyer, G.-P., and R. W. Hafer (1989): “Interest rates and economic announcements,”
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 71, 34–46.
Ederington, L. H., and J. H. Lee (1993): “How markets process information: News
releases and volatility,” Journal of Finance, 48, 1161–1191.
(1995): “The short-run dynamics of the price adjustment to new information,”
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31, 117–134.
Edison, H. J. (1996): “The reaction of exchange rates and interest rates to news releases,”
Discussion Paper 570, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Fleming, M. J., and E. M. Remolona (1997): “What moves the bond market,” Eco-
nomic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, December, 31–50.
(1999a): “Price formation and liquidity in the U.S. Treasury market: The response
to public information,” Journal of Finance, 54, 1901–1915.
(1999b): “The term structure of announcement eﬀects,” Discussion paper, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.
Franke, G., and D. Hess (2000a): “The impact of scheduled news announcements on
T-bond and Bund futures trading,” in Institutional Arrangements for Global Economic
Integration, ed. by H.-J. Vosgerau, pp. 337–366, MacMillan, London.
34(2000b): “Information diﬀusion in electronic and ﬂoor trading,” Journal of Em-
pirical Finance, 7, 455–478.
French, K. R., W. Schwert, and R. F. Stambaugh (1987): “Expected stock returns
and volatility,” Journal of Financial Economics, 19, 3–30.
Goodhart, C. A. E., S. G. Hall, S. G. B. Henry, and B. Pesaran (1993): “News
Eﬀects in a High-Frequency Model of the Sterling-Dollar Exchange Rate,” Journal of
Applied Econometrics, 8, 1–13.
Goodhart, C. A. E., and M. O'Hara (1997): “High frequency data in ﬁnancial mar-
kets: Issues and applications,” Journal of Empirical Finance, 4, 73–114.
Hardouvelis, G. A. (1988): “Economic news, exchange rates, and interest rates,” Jour-
nal of International Money and Finance, 7, 23–35.
Harris, L. (1987): “Transaction data tests of the mixture of distributions hypothesis,”
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 22, 127–141.
Harris, M., and A. Raviv (1993): “Diﬀerence of opinion make a horse race,” Review of
Financial Studies, 6, 473–506.
Harvey, C. R., and R. D. Huang (1991): “Volatility in the foreign currency futures
market,” Review of Financial Studies, 4, 543–569.
Hess, D. (2001): “Surprises in U.S. macroeconomic releases: Determinants of their relative
impact on T-Bond futures,” Discussion Paper 01/01, Center of Finance and Economet-
rics, University of Konstanz.
Hess, D., and M. Moersch (2001): “Predictability in analysts’ forecast errors: Does
discreteness matter?,” Working paper, University of Konstanz.
Jones, C. (1998): “The economic sources of long memory in interest rate volatility,”
Second International Conference on High Frequency Data in Finance, Proceedings, Vol.
2, Olsen and Associates, Z¨ urich.
Jones, C., O. Lamont, and R. Lumsdaine (1998): “Macroeconomic news and bond
market volatility,” Journal of Financial Economics, 47, 315–337.
Kandel, E., and N. D. Pearson (1995): “Diﬀerential interpretation of public signals
and trade in speculative markets,” Journal of Political Economy, 103, 831–872.
Karpoff, J. M. (1987): “The relation between price changes and trading volume: a
survey,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 22, 109–126.
35Lamoureux, C. G., and W. D. Lastrapes (1990): “Heteroskedasticity in stock return
data: volume versus GARCH eﬀects,” Journal of Finance, 45, 221–229.
Li, L., and R. F. Engle (1998): “Macroeconomic announcements and volatility of Trea-
sury futures,” Discussion paper, Department of Economics, University of California,
San Diego Discussion Paper 98-27.
M uller, U. A., M. M. Dacorogna, R. D. Dav e, R. B. Olsen, O. V. Pictet, and
J. E. von Weizs acker (1997): “Volatilities of diﬀerent time resolutions - Analyzing
the dynamics of market components,” Journal of Empirical Finance, 4, 213–39.
Niemira, M. P., and G. F. Zukowski (1998): Trading the fundamentals: The trader’s
guide to interpreting economic indicators and monetary policy. McGraw Hill, New York.
Pagan, A. R., and G. W. Schwert (1990): “Alternative models for conditional stock
volatility,” Journal of Econometrics, 45, 267–290.
Pindyck, R. S. (1984): “Risk, inﬂation, and the stock market,” American Economic
Review, 74, 334–351.
Prag, J. (1994): “The response of interest rates to unemployment rate announcements:
Is there a natural rate of unemployment,” Journal of Macroeconomics, 16, 171–184.
Rogers, R. M. (1998): Handbook of key economic indicators. McGraw Hill, New York, 2
edn.
Urich, T., and P. Wachtel (1981): “Market response to the weekly money supply
announcements in the 1970s,” Journal of Finance, 36, 1063–1072.
(1984): “The eﬀects of inﬂation and money supply announcemnets on interest
rates,” Journal of Finance, 39, 1177–1188.
Varian, H. R. (1985): “Divergence of opinion in complete markets,” Journal of Finance,
40, 309–317.
36Figure 1: 2-minute returns around employment releases
Descriptive statistics of 2-minute log returns (times 10000) during the interval 8:22 to 9:52 a.m.
ET at employment announcement days are reported. The sample period is January 1995 to
December 1999, resulting in 53 days at which no other macroeconomic report is released along
with the employment report. 1% and 99% percentiles (solid lines) are displayed as well as 5%
and 95% percentiles (dotted lines).Table 1: Mean function estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
const ¡0:126 0:225 0:073 0:135 0:164 0:282
¤
rt¡1 ¡0:027 ¡0:098















































2 0:001 0:181 0:136 0:058 0:324 0:312





BIC ¡0:004 0:023 0:022 0:022 0:076 0:019
OLS regressions of 2-minute log returns at employment report announcement days. The sample
period is January 1995 to December 1999. 53 days are used at which no other report is announced
along with the employment report. For each of these days the intraday interval 8:22–9:52 ET is
analyzed. The adjusted coeﬃcient of determination ( ¯ R
2) is given as well as the results of a regular
F-test on the hypothesis of a zero coeﬃcient vector. The Bayes information criterion (BIC) is also




signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.Table 2: Simultaneous estimation of the mean and variance function




































































































































































D9:20¡9:30 0:217 0:199 0:230 0:210
¤ 0:243
¤





























BIC 7:235 6:820 6:795 6:798 6:793 6:795
®0 43:606
¤¤¤ ¡4:354 ¡4:584 ¡5:337 ¡4:566 ¡11:330
®1 0:477
¤¤¤ 1:024 1:040 1:046 1:039 1:126
¤¤¤
F®0=0;®1=1 7:619
¤¤¤ 0:569 0:302 0:295 0:203 0:447
R
2 0:060 0:229 0:242 0:249 0:250 0:287
Maximum Likelihood estimation of 2-minute log returns at employment report announcement days (sample
period: January 1995 to December 1999, i.e. 53 non-overlapping employment announcement days). For each
day the intraday interval 8:22–9:52 ET is analyzed. The Bayes information criterion (BIC) as well as the R
2
from the regression ˆ "
2
t = a0 +a1ˆ ht +ºt is given along with the results of an F-test on the joint hypothesis of
a0 = 0 and a1 = 1 (F®0=0;®1=1). Inference is based on pseudo ML standard errors (Bollerslev and Wooldridge
1992).Table 3: Simultaneous estimation of the mean and variance response to the
announcement of the NAPM index, consumer prices, and housing starts.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NAPM Overall CPI Core CPI HS
Mean:




















































































D9:00¡9:10 ¡0:037 0:027 ¡0:022 ¡0:158
D9:10¡9:20 ¡0:731
¤¤ 0:141 0:098 0:031
D9:20¡9:30 ¡0:761
¤¤¤ ¡0:205 ¡0:211 ¡0:400
¤¤¤












BIC 6:205 5:892 5:890 5:616
®0 17:727







¤¤¤ 0:262 0:031 0:253
R
2 0:040 0:219 0:201 0:209
Maximum Likelihood estimation of 2-minute log returns during 90-minute intervals around
the announcements of the National Association of Purchasing Managers (NAPM) index,
consumer prices (CPI), and housing starts (HS). The CPI report contains two headline
ﬁgures, i.e. the overall index and a core index. During the sample period, January 1995
to December 1999, we observe 12 NAPM, 17 CPI, and 41 HS announcements without an
overlap with other releases. For further details see table 2.